A political economic theory of the dental care market.

Abstract

A theory of the dental care market is introduced which proposes that the vertically integrated (local/state/national) structure of the profession services as an organizational vehicle both for intra-professional debate and for developing provider-oriented dental care policy. We suggest that a special relationship exists between professionalism and professional regulation. Such regulation has functioned simultaneously to limit competition and to foster a prized consumption commodity for providers: professionalism and professional esteem. The organized pursuit of this commodity inherently dampens competition. Professionalism itself plays a crucial role in: 1) securing for organized dentistry a form of state regulation in which the providers themselves are the principal decision-makers; and 2) influencing provider and consumer market behavior in several significant respects, the net result being the formation of maintenance of a type of "leadership cartel" in the local market. Thus, a political-economic theory of the dental care market formally acknowledges professionalism as valued by established dentists and recent graduates as a central determining influence. Traditional models of pure competition and monopoly emerge as special, extreme cases of the general theory. Hypotheses are offered regarding consumer and provider behavior, market dynamics, and health policy and regulation.