Mechanisms and Laws: Clarifying the Debate

Abstract

Leuridan (2010) questions whether mechanisms can really replace laws at the heart of our thinking about science. In doing so, he enters a long-standing discussion about the relationship between the mechanistic structures evident in the theories of contemporary biology and the laws of nature privileged especially in traditional empiricist traditions of the philosophy of science (see, e.g., Wimsatt 1974; Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005; Bogen, Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci, 36:397–420, 2005; Darden 2006; Glennan, Erkenntnis, 44:49–71, 1996; MDC, Philos Sci, 67:1–25, 2000; Schaffner 1993; Tabery 2004; Weber 2005). In our view, Leuridan misconstrues this discussion. His weak positive claim that mechanistic sciences appeal to generalizations is true but uninteresting. His stronger claim that all causal claims require laws is unsupported by his arguments. Though we proceed by criticizing Leuridan’s arguments, our greater purpose is to embellish his arguments in order to show how thinking about mechanisms enriches and transforms old philosophical debates about laws in biology and provides new insights into how generalizations afford prediction, explanation, and control.