Artificial intelligence and legal personality: Introducing “Teilrechtsfähigkeit”: A partial legal status made in Germany

Abstract

What exactly are intelligent agents in legal terms? Are we just looking at sophisticated objects? Or should such systems be treated as legal persons, somewhat similar to humans? In this article I will argue in favor of a ‘halfway’ or ‘in-between’ status that the German civil law has to offer: Teilrechtsfähigkeit, a status of partial legal subjectivity based on certain legal capabilities. When applied, intelligent agents would be treated as legal subjects as far as this status followed their function as sophisticated servants. This would both deflect the ‘autonomy risk’ and fill most of the ‘responsibility gaps’ without the negative side effects of full legal personhood. However, taking into consideration the example of animals, it is unlikely that courts will recognize Teilrechtsfähigkeit for intelligent agents on their own. This calls for the lawmaker to come up with a slight push, which I call the ‘reversed animal rule’: It should be made clear by statute that intelligent agents are not persons, yet that they can still bear certain legal capabilities consistent with their serving function.