In this paper we design renewable traitor tracing scheme for anonymous attack. When pirated copies of some copyrighted content or content decrypting key are found, a traitor tracing scheme could identify at least one of the real users (traitors) who participate in the construction of the pirated content/key. When traitors are identified, the renewable scheme can revoke and exclude the decryption keys used by the traitors during piracy. Moreover, the revocation information included in the newly released content needs not only to disallow traitors to playback the new content, but also provide new tracing information for continuous tracing. This trace-revoke-trace system is the first such system for anonymous attack. It poses new challenges over the trace-revoke system that has extensively studied in the literatures for the pirate decoder attack. We hope the technologies described in this paper can shed new insights on future directions in this area for academia research. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007.
CITATION STYLE
Jin, H., & Lotspiech, J. (2007). Renewable traitor tracing: A trace-revoke-trace system for anonymous attack. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 4734 LNCS, pp. 563–577). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74835-9_37
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