Estimating shapley values for fair profit distribution in power planning smart grid coalitions

Abstract

In future, highly dynamic energy grids a likely scenario is to have dynamically founded groups of distributed energy resources that are in charge of jointly delivering a demanded load schedule for a certain time horizon. In market based scenarios, such a demanded load schedule would be a (day ahead) product that is to be delivered by a coalition of energy resources. Computational aspects of the underlying optimization problem or of proper coalition formation are already subject to many research efforts. In this paper, we focus on the question of fairly sharing the profit among the members of such a coalition. Distributing the surplus merely based on the absolute (load) contribution does not take into account that smaller units maybe provide the means for fine grained control as they are able to modify their load on a smaller scale. Shapley values provide a concept for the decision on how the generated total surplus of an agent coalition should be spread. In this paper, we propose a scheme for efficiently estimating computationally intractable Shapley values as a prospective base for future surplus distribution schemes for smart grid coalitions and discuss some first ideas on how to use them for smart grid active power product coalitions. © 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.