The Relationship Between Human Nature and Human Rights. The Confucian Example

Abstract

In this paper, the author wants to address the problem of consequences of the classical Confucian view of human nature and possible arguments, conclusions, and assumptions concerning rights within Confucianism that are pre-established and grounded in “nature”. The author’s aim is to analyze the impact of the particular vision of human nature developed by Mengzi on the “discursive space of Confucianism” and to analyze the elements of Mencian theory that determine the lack (or weakness) of recognition of rights and even the existence of the discourse on rights within Confucian philosophical tradition. A working thesis is that a well-established Confucian (Mencian) concept of inborn goodness (i.e., four, hard-wired emotional “sprouts” and a capacity to develop them) that, in many ways, preceded scientific discoveries, was rather an obstacle to developing sensitivity for human rights in the Middle Kingdom and not its stimulus. The Confucian example provides a starting point for preliminary statements concerning the status of and justification for human rights.