Formal models of verification

Abstract

Inspection regimes for arms control and disarmament provide good examples of potential conflict situations that are subject to quantitative analysis. The inspected party, in this case a sovereign State, may have some incentive to violate its commitments deliberately and in a clandestine way, a possibility that necessitates the regime's verification measures. The Inspectorate, acting on behalf of a community of participating States (e.g. The United Nations), will wish to deter such illegal activity and, should that illegal activity nevertheless take place, detect it with the highest possible probability and speed. The potential violator knows that, by virtue of the inspection regime, a violation risks detection and may incur punishment in the form of sanctions or even military intervention. Therefore, if a State chooses illegal behavior, it will wish to avoid detection with the highest possible probability or at least delay detection for as long as possible. © 2006 Springer Berlin · Heidelberg.