Budget participation, information asymmetry, and job insecurity as a predictor of budgetary slack

Abstract

Budgetary slack occurs because of the potential difference with the revenue budget target. the difference in potential revenue with the revenue budget target indicates the occurrence of individual behavior lowering the income target to facilitate the achievement of the government budget. The purpose of this study is to empirically prove the effect of budget participation, information asymmetry, and job insecurity that trigger budgetary slack. The population of this research is officials of the Indonesian: Regional Working Unit in the province of East Java, Indonesia. The sampling technique used is proportional sampling, the research respondents were 84 people. The results show that budget participation, information asymmetry, and job insecurity have a positive effect on budgetary slack. The high budget participation of public sector employees can trigger budgetary slack. Information asymmetry motivates budget implementers to take action to reduce revenue targets and increase government spending. High job insecurity in the work environment creates pressure on employees so that budgetary slack is created.