Abstract
We prove that every key exchange protocol in the random oracle model in which the honest users make at most n queries to the oracle can be broken by an adversary making O(n 2) queries to the oracle. This improves on the previous Ω(n 6) query attack given by Impagliazzo and Rudich (STOC '89), and answers an open question posed by them. Our bound is optimal up to a constant factor since Merkle (CACM '78) gave a key exchange protocol that can easily be implemented in this model with n queries and cannot be broken by an adversary making o(n 2) queries. © 2009 Springer.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Barak, B., & Mahmoody-Ghidary, M. (2009). Merkle puzzles are optimal - An O(n 2)-query attack on any key exchange from a random oracle. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 5677 LNCS, pp. 374–390). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03356-8_22
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