In this paper we offer a novel methodology for verifying correctness of (timed) security protocols. The idea consists in computing the time of a correct execution of a session and finding out whether the Intruder can change it to shorter or longer by an active attack. Moreover, we generalize the correspondence property so that attacks can be also discovered when some time constraints are not satisfied. As case studies we verify generalized authentication of KERBEROS, TMN, Neumann Stubblebine Protocol, Andrew Secure Protocol, WMF, and NSPK. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007.
CITATION STYLE
Jakubowska, G., & Penczek, W. (2007). Is your security protocol on time? In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 4767 LNCS, pp. 65–80). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75698-9_5
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