A common objection to theories of vagueness based on fuzzy logics centres on the idea that assigning a single numerical degree of truth—a real number between 0 and 1—to each vague statement is excessively precise. A common objection to Bayesian epistemology centres on the idea that assigning a single numerical degree of belief—a real number between 0 and 1—to each proposition is excessively precise. In this paper I explore possible parallels between these objections. In particular I argue that the only good objection along these lines to fuzzy theories of vagueness does not translate into a good objection to Bayesian epistemology. An important part of my argument consists in drawing a distinction between two different notions of degree of belief, which I call dispositional degree of belief and epistemic degree of belief.
CITATION STYLE
Smith, N. J. J. (2019). Problems of Precision in Fuzzy Theories of Vagueness and Bayesian Epistemology. In Language, Cognition, and Mind (Vol. 5, pp. 31–48). Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15931-3_3
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