Performance, Governance Structure and Executive Compensation of Listed Commercial Banks

  • Wang D
  • Chen F
N/ACitations
Citations of this article
5Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.
Get full text

Abstract

his paper selects the data of 14 listed commercial Banks from 2008 to 2013 as the research sample, using principal component analysis method to construct a comprehensive bank performance indicators. Under the control of variables such as Bank characteristics and Executive characteristics, this article empirically analysis the role of Bank governance structure and Bank performance in the process of Executive compensation formulating. The results show that: the Bank performance of listed commercial Banks in China is not related with Executive compensation; the independent directors proportion and executive pay have significantly negative correlation; the board size and the first big shareholder shareholding proportion are positively related to Executive compensation; at the same time, when the nature of the state-owned bank is actually controlled, their executive pay is lower than other types of banks.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Wang, D., & Chen, F. (2016). Performance, Governance Structure and Executive Compensation of Listed Commercial Banks. In Proceedings of the 6th International Asia Conference on Industrial Engineering and Management Innovation (pp. 279–291). Atlantis Press. https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6239-148-2_28

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free