Cryptanalysis of Truong et al.'s fingerprint biometric remote authentication scheme using mobile device

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Abstract

In 2010, Chen et al. focused at the vulnerability of smart card based authentication systems owing to leakage of secret information from smart card. They proposed a scheme with a view to boost the security of such authentication systems. However, in 2012, Truong et al. found Chen et al.'s scheme weak at resisting replay attack and spoofing attacks; thereby they proposed an improved scheme to counterfeit these weaknesses. Undoubtedly, the improved scheme by Truong et al. is free from defects pointed out on Chen et al.'s scheme, but here we show that problems like impersonation attacks, password guessing, etc are adhered with its design. We show that Truong et al.'s scheme violates Chen et al.'s aim to get rid of information-leak hazard from the smart card or mobile device based authentication schemes. © 2013 Springer-Verlag.

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Khan, M. K., Kumari, S., Gupta, M. K., & Muhaya, F. T. B. (2013). Cryptanalysis of Truong et al.’s fingerprint biometric remote authentication scheme using mobile device. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 7888 LNAI, pp. 271–277). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-38786-9_31

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