In a number of recent pieces, Duncan Pritchard has used cases with the structure of Goldman’s infamous fake barn case to argue against (i) a promising virtue epistemological account of knowledge and (ii) a promising knowledge-based account of understanding. This paper aims to defend both of these views against Pritchard’s objections. More specifically, I outline two ways of resisting Pritchard’s objections. The first allows for knowledge in fake barn cases and explains the intuition of ignorance away. In contrast, the second response appeals to a plausible alternative account of understanding. Each of the resulting views is shown to be epistemologically viable and preferable to the alternative Pritchard’s offers.
CITATION STYLE
Kelp, C. (2014). Knowledge, Understanding and Virtue. In Synthese Library (Vol. 366, pp. 347–360). Springer Science and Business Media B.V. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-04672-3_20
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