Structure and Perspective: Philosophical Perplexity and Paradox

Abstract

My topic today is structuralism in the philosophy of science. The name “structuralism” is often used in a narrow sense to denote specific programs, such as Bourbaki’s in mathematics and the approach to science due to Sneed and Stegmüller. I will use it in a broad sense, for any of a variety of views to the effect that science describes only structure, that scientific theories give us information only about the structure of processes in nature, or even that all we can know is structure. Since the very term “structuralism” comes from a by now fragile traditional distinction between form and structure, I will focus on the precise formulation of such views, with little regard to whether they honor that putative distinction. I shall describe some of the history of the general idea and its problems, and then ask what form of structuralism could be viable today.