Motives, Rules, and Rationality

Abstract

Argues that if we can show that universal benevolence is the grounding motive of all morality, than we can also claim that self-concern, concern for one’s own well being, constitutes the motivational core of any agent-based account of practical rationality.Then, rules will lack a fundamental role in practical reason. Slote offers an agent-based account for practical rationality which differs from familiar accounts for individualistic rationality. The main difference is that the former largely focuses on motives rather than consequences. According to Hume, the desire to do the best for oneself just comes naturally. If people are assumed to act rationally, that come just natural to them, so that there is no rule or principle one has to assume if we think that maximization is required from us by rationality. Acting benevolent can also be seen in this same light, namely that the benevolent person just wants to obtain the best for her but without thinking that morality does require the benevolent act. Utility-focused decision theory cannot account for irrationality referring to the indifference to one’s own well being. It does also not say anything about the rationality or irrationality of motives. Standard accounts therefore should be extended to include claims about the conditions under which certain motives are rational or irrational. Utilitarians: motives are acceptable if they maximize overall well being Rule – utilitarianism assess motives/rules and actions/choices in different ways, e.g.by evaluating motives/rules in terms of whether they stem from/are in accordance with good producing motives/rules.  Analogous in RCT: Gaultier: intentions (motives?) are rational if utility-maximizing, but choices and actions are rational if the intentions behind them are rational. Agent-based view: the motive of maximal self-concern is inherently in a way that benevolence is inherently praiseworthy. Irrationality can be seen as a function of its inherent intentional character as a motive (in just the way benevolence is inherently praiseworthy, according to a certain agent-based morality). Sometimes, even if the consequences are (morally) acceptable, the motive of the person is criticisable. So, in the area of morality and rationality, the acceptability or goodness of motives is a matter of their inherent character as motives rather than of the (expectable) goodness of their consequences. Then, the most fundamental claim of an agent-based theory of practical reason is that it is irrational not to be practically concerned with one’s own well-being, i.e. that a certain motive, or lack of it, is irrational. The rationality of choices or actions will depend on whether they come from or reflect motivation that is practically rational. Slote belives in a satisficing rather than optimizing view (See book ‘Beyond Optimizing’). Why does an agent-based account should treat self-concern as a condition of practical rationality but should deny that it is rational for us to want as much as we can of certain things we think good? -> Means that we are rationally required to be concerned to promote our own good, but that at least in some situations we are rationally forbidden to seek or desire our greatest possible good. There is something inherently irrational about overeating because they causally derive from an irrational motivational state. There is nothing about desire per se that must be painful (but this would be the consequentialist account). A consequentialist view, which does derive irrationality from certain consequences does fail in some cases where we have strong intuitions about. This is a radical approach because a) it bases human rationality on motives b) rules lack an essential role in practical rationality. Actions are not guided by principles or any rules. Standards of rationality do not have to guide people but help to understand.