In this article, I analyze how interests affect the results of scientific change through concept representation and categorization. I first review two models offered by cognitive psychology, which use frames as the representational structure to account for how interests actually affect concept representation and categorization. I then use a historical case from nineteenth-century optics to illustrate how the interests of historical figures influenced their concept representations, then their classifications and finally the results of their theory appraisal. I conclude that the impact of interests on science is constrained by the states of the world and interests alone can never decide the results of scientific change.
CITATION STYLE
Chen, X. (2014). Interests in Conceptual Changes: A Frame Analysis. In Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy (Vol. 94, pp. 111–122). Springer Science and Business Media B.V. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01541-5_5
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