A concrete experience: The Iraq case

Abstract

Verification in Iraq under a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandate was a very specific case. It took place under unusual circumstances, beginning as the outcome of one war and terminated by the breakout of a second war. Its legal foundation was not that of a willingly accepted treaty commitment, but the verification of a cease-fire agreement and Chapter VII action by the Security Council. It was the first in a series of activities that raised public awareness of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA or Agency) anti-proliferation role from relative obscurity to headline news (and most recently, to heightened status as the winner of the 2005 Nobel Peace Price). And from a purely technological viewpoint, the Iraq verification approach evolved in a manner that reflected the broader progress in technology and information processing that has characterized all aspects of modern society. Consequently, in the context of a book dealing with the 'new discipline' of treaty verification, it is perhaps natural that the most extensive and dramatic nuclear verification exercise to date would provide food for thought. Having devoted more than 13 years of my life to following the evolution of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme (11 at the IAEA, nearly six as the Leader of the IAEA's Iraq Team reporting to the Agency's Director General), I would be pleased if my experiences and viewpoints could make a modest contribution to the efforts of the international community to address modern proliferation and verification challenges. With this article, I will try to highlight the generic aspects of the IAEA's Iraq experience. The various processes that led to the well-known achievements of the Agency will be addressed, from the discovery phase to the drawing of conclusions. © 2006 Springer Berlin · Heidelberg.