Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellung in Reinholds Elementarphilosophie

Abstract

This essay investigates the “content/object” (Inhalt/Gegenstand) conceptual relation at three levels: (a) From the point of view of the system of the Elementary Philosophy (Elementarphilosophie), considered in its evolution. It is shown in this respect that Reinhold, in order to avoid certain incongruities present in Versuch (1789), and in the Beyträge (1790) attributes to the subject a new and active role. The object is now originatively definable only through a distinction which is performed by the subject and which the subject formulates in the Satz des Bewußtsein s; (b) With reference to the relation’s principal characteristics. Between Inhalt and Gegenstand there exists a distinction which is logical and not real; moreover, the possibility of representation (Vorstellbarkeit) that binds the two together is one which modifies rather than determines; for this reason, there are no representations without an object; (c) With reference to Kant’s table of the Nichts. Does the fact that there are no representations without an object mean that the Nichts is a true and proper object or that it is rather only a syncategorematic expression?