Illegitimate Values, Confirmation Bias, and Mandevillian Cognition in Science

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Abstract

The proposal that values in science are illegitimate and that they should be counteracted whenever they direct inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions is not uncommon in the philosophy of science. Drawing on recent research from cognitive science on human reasoning and confirmation bias, I argue that this view should be rejected. Values that drive inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions can contribute to the reliability of scientific inquiry at the group level, even when they negatively affect an individual’s cognition. This casts doubt on the proposal that such values should always be illegitimate in science. It also suggests that this proposal assumes a narrow, individualistic account of science that threatens to undermine the project of ensuring reliable belief-formation in science.

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CITATION STYLE

APA

Peters, U. (2021). Illegitimate Values, Confirmation Bias, and Mandevillian Cognition in Science. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 72(4), 1061–1081. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axy079

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