An Epistemological Approach to the Symbol Grounding Problem: The Difference Between Perception and Demonstrative Knowledge and Two Ways of Being Meaningful

Abstract

I propose a formal approach towards solving Harnad’s “Symbol Grounding Problem” (SGP) through epistemological analogy. (Sect. 1) The SGP and Taddeo and Floridi’s “Zero Semantical Commitment Condition” (z-condition) for its solution are both revisited using Frege’s philosophy of language, in such a way that the SGP is converted into two circumscribed tasks. (Sect. 2) The ground for studying these tasks within human cognition is that both the human mind and AI are conceivable, as in Newell’s “physical symbol systems” (PSSs), and that they share the core of the SGP: the problem of constructing an objective reference. (Sect. 3) After two forms of reference have been identified in the human mind, I then show why the latter may constitute a model for facing the SGP.