Abstract
If the physical description of a person would be unique and adequately used and tested, then the security of the Fiat-Shamir scheme is not based on zero-knowledge. Otherwise some new frauds exist. The Feige-Fiat-Shamir scheme always suffers from these bauds. Using an extended notion of subliminal channels, several other undetectable abuses of the Fiat-Shamir protocol, which are not possible with ordinary passports, are discussed. This technique can be used by a terrorist sponsoring country to communicate 500 new words of secret information each time a tourist passport is verified. A non-trivial solution to avoid these subliminal channel problems is presented. The notion of relative zero-knowledge is introduced.
Cite
CITATION STYLE
Desmedt, Y., Goutier, C., & Bengio, S. (1988). Special uses and abuses of the fiat-shamir passport protocol. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 293 LNCS, pp. 21–39). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48184-2_3
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