Holding China’s West: Explaining CCP Strategies of Rule in Tibet and Xinjiang

Abstract

Over the course of Communist Party rule in China, what explains the continuities and changes in the policies used to exert control and to combat secessionist threats in Tibet and Xinjiang? We begin with a standard conflict bargaining framework, which emphasizes three proximate decision-theoretic variables: status quo political, economic and cultural conditions in the minority regions; relative military power; and leadership preferences. Among these proximate factors, the most potent source of variation over time has been the preferences of Chinese leaders—particularly of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. We also discuss how China’s broader structural and institutional conditions have an effect through their influence on leadership preferences and decisions. Over time, these broader structural and institutional conditions have pushed toward greater uniformity of state policies in the minority regions—overriding the tendency of leadership and regional differences to produce variation in such policies.