A password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol in the three-party setting allows two users communicating over a public network to agree on a common session key by the help of a server. In the setting the users do not share a password between themselves, but only with the server. In this paper, we explore the possibility of designing a round-efficient three-party PAKE protocol with a method to protect against undetectable on-line dictionary attacks without using the random oracle. The protocol matches the most efficient three-party PAKE protocol secure against undetectable on-line dictionary attacks among those found in the literature while providing the same level of security. Finally, we indentify the relations between detectable on-line and undetectable on-line dictionary attacks by providing counter-examples to support the observed relations 1. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2006.
CITATION STYLE
Kwon, J. O., Sakurai, K., & Lee, D. H. (2006). Efficient password-authenticated key exchange for three-party secure against undetectable on-line dictionary attacks. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 3991 LNCS-I, pp. 977–980). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/11758501_152
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