We present a new approach for cryptographic end-to-end verifiable optical-scan voting. Ours is the first that does not rely on a single point of trust to protect ballot secrecy while simultaneously offering a conventional single layer ballot form and unencrypted paper trail. We present two systems following this approach. The first system uses ballots with randomized confirmation codes and a physical in-person dispute resolution procedure. The second system improves upon the first by offering an informational dispute resolution procedure and a public paper audit trail through the use of self-blanking invisible ink confirmation codes. We then present a security analysis of the improved system. © 2012 Springer-Verlag.
CITATION STYLE
Essex, A., Henrich, C., & Hengartner, U. (2012). Single layer optical-scan voting with fully distributed trust. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 7187 LNCS, pp. 122–139). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32747-6_8
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