Social persons and the normativity of needs

Abstract

There has been significant work done in contemporary African philosophy on what it means to be a person. Moreover, there is significant consensus that a traditional African conception of person not only emphasises the social aspects but also entails that in political reasoning higher premium is placed on the duties individuals have to others and the community at large, as opposed to whatever rights they may have. In contrast, not much work has been done to unpack the precise relationship between that conception of social person and the normativity of needs in political thought, although such a relationship is often assumed. I want to explore the idea of person behind the experience and practice of communalism in traditional African communities and by so doing suggest how the resulting understanding of person in traditional thought, particularly in the work of Ifeanyi Menkiti and Kwasi Wiredu, might offer theoretical grounding for an African political philosophy that foregrounds needs. Beyond all these, however, I offer some perspective on the nature and normativity of needs. I finish off by suggesting how grounding needs in this traditional African idea of person provides us with ways of responding to some doubts about the normativity of needs in general.