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Book Chapter

Generalized Vickrey Auction

  • Yokoo M
Springer New York, (2016), 821-824
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4939-2864-4_163
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Abstract

We describe a generalization of the Vickrey auction. Our mechanism extends the auction to implement efficient allocations for problems with more than one good, multiple units for the goods, and externalities. The primary restriction on preferences is that they must be quasilinear.

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APA

Yokoo, M. (2016). Generalized Vickrey Auction. In Encyclopedia of Algorithms (pp. 821–824). Springer New York. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-2864-4_163

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