On Russell’s Logical Atomism

Abstract

I argue that Russell's logical atomism has been misunderstood as an epistemologically-driven search for complexes constituted by logical atoms with which we are acquainted, which I call acquaintance-complexes. This epistemologically-driven search for acquaintance-complexes, while important to the Russell of the 1918 logical atomism lectures, is not the essence of logical atomism. This is because interpreting Russell's logical atomism as a search for acquaintance-complexes produces a grossly inaccurate history of logical atomism. This interpretation fails to fit the historical data we have about logical atomism's origins and its longevity in Russell's thought. It also fails to fit the data contained in the logical atomist texts, such as Russell's own statements about what logical atomism is. After establishing this negative conclusion, I offer desiderata for a correct interpretation of logical atomism.