Consciousness and second-order representation: From Reinhold via Fichte to Rosenthal

Abstract

In his Elementary Philosophy, Reinhold intends to found critical philosophy on a theory about the conditions which make representation as such possible. To Reinhold, this means at the same time to investigate the conditions which are constitutive of consciousness in general. On this base, Reinhold develops a theory about the particular species of consciousness which are necessary for knowledge and which reveal the reflective character of consciousness. Reinhold's analysis of these particular types of consciousness essentially involves the notion of second-order representations. This paper aims to reconstruct Reinhold's theory of secondorder representations and to put it into the context of posterior discussions about higherorder representations. For this purpose, the Fichtean transformation of Reinhold's conception of second order representations in his Own Meditations on Elementary Philosophy and the higher-order thought theory of consciousness defended by David M. Rosenthal are discussed. It is shown that post-kantian thinking, initiated by Reinhold, brought forth questions and conceptions that are present in the debates of today's philosophy of mind.