Evolutionary epistemology: The non-adaptationist approach

Abstract

Earlier versions of evolutionary epistemology were based on-or at least strongly informed by-the adaptationist paradigm. It is for this reason that advocates of evolutionary epistemol-ogy have been frequently criticized by those who have adopted an organismic perspective in evolutionary thinking. Evolutionists defending the view that any living system-including all its characters at the anatomical as well as the behavioral level-can be sufficiently explained in terms of adaptation, have neglected the (somehow trivial) fact that organisms are active systems that do not entirely depend on their respective environment(s). Meanwhile, however, a systems-theoretical approach to understanding living beings and their evolution has made clear that (1) organisms and their environment(s) have a common history and have not evolved independent of each other, (2) any living system and its environment(s) are linked together by a feedback principle, and (3) adaptability is not defined by the environment but the organism itself. This has serious consequences for evolutionary epistemology. In this paper, I outline a non-adaptationist version of this epistemology. I also briefly discuss its philosophical implications. The main focus is the problem of realism.