Political parties, state resources and electoral clientelism

Abstract

Contemporary political parties often use state resources to win elections. In this con-text, electoral clientelism evolved from the straightforward vote buying to sophisti-cated exchanges in which the relationship between patrons (parties or candidates) and clients (voters) is sometimes difficult to grasp. We address the question how do the distributive politics and electoral clientelism interact, how these forms of inter-actions differ across various context, and what implications they bring for the func-tioning of political systems. The special issue provides theoretical, methodological and empirical contributions to the burgeoning literature about the multi-faceted fea-ture of electoral clientelism. It unfolds the complex relationship between distribu¬tive politics and clientelism, and conceptualizes electoral clientelism as a dynamic process that occurs through different sequences. It enriches the methodological tools aimed at investigating electoral clientelism. Finally, the special issue approaches clientelism from several perspectives and brings together substantive empirical evi¬dence about the varieties of clientelism around the world.