Just as the DSM-5 was about to be finalized, the National Institute for Mental Health (NIMH) launched its “Research Domain Criteria” (RDoC) initiative, a project that has been seen by many as a disavowal of the type of nosological enterprise incarnated by the DSM itself, from DSM-III to DSM-5. In our paper, we first want to describe the context in which RDoC appeared and demonstrate that, if it is not a disavowal of the DSM-5’s work, it certainly signals the abandonment of a method of trying to establish a valid nosology; a paradigm shift in nosology so to speak. We will then question if RDoC is a reductionist enterprise. We will explain why RDoC is not reductionist in a strong and naïve sense, but why it could be understood as reductionist in a weaker sense. If this weaker form of reductionism does not possess the problems the stronger forms of reductionism do, it might nonetheless generate problems of its own that researchers should be aware of. We will try to delineate some of these problems.
CITATION STYLE
Faucher, L., & Goyer, S. (2015). RDoC: Thinking Outside the DSM Box Without Falling into a Reductionist Trap. In History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences (Vol. 10, pp. 199–224). Springer Science and Business Media B.V. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-9765-8_12
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