Las dos almas de la teología del siglo III: Tertuliano, de anima - orígenes de principiis

Abstract

The goal of this study is to show the similarities and differences between Origen and Tertullian regarding the doctrine of the soul. In the first place, the definition of soul in both authors is discussed. In Origen the terminology is borrowed from Stoicism; in Tertullian the definition is an arbitrary reconstruction out of Platonic elements. Attention is then turned to certain aspects of anthropology, such as the origin and nature of the soul, moral responsibility, and the problem of separated souls. The two authors give the same etymological explanation of the name of the soul, gathered from the philosophical tradition. Tertullian links this etymology with Genesis. Origen discusses two alternatives regarding the moment of the union of soul and body. Tertullian and Origen employ two alternative hypotheses to explain the same problem: the transmission of original sin can be accounted for the pre-existence of souls (Origen), or by Traducianism (Tertullian). In Tertullian corporeity is synonymous with reality and substantiality; Origen also attributes to the soul some corporeity. Freedom, in Origen, is a struggle between the forces of good and evil in the soul. Also in Tertullian the soul has the power of free will, which inheres in man naturally. But whereas Origen seems to put the soul before two alternatives, between which it freely chooses, Tertullian says that it is naturally good, although tempted by the "irrationale". Both authors affirm the immortality of the soul, but in Origin there is a connection between immortality and image-likeness, while in Tertullian there is no such a connection. In both cases we find that one of the characteristics of the soul is transferred to the body at the resurrection: spirituality. However, for Origen, the body is not destroyed, as it is for Tertullian, but rather it is transformed through the merit of the soul, which thus becomes responsible for sin.