The research results presented here cast doubt on previous research, which clearly indicated that contextual factors determined differences in parliamentary oversight (and hence corruption). Our results are rather inconclusive: on the basis of country size, population and economy, Grenada might be expected to have lower corruption, while on the basis of government and opposition parties, Trinidad & Tobago should have lower corruption; the other factors are indeterminate. Our results also cast doubt that the establishment or adoption of oversight tools is a determinant of corruption—both countries have a similar range of internal parliamentary oversight tools, namely, Public Accounts and other oversight committees, question time, and votes of no confidence—although, neither country’s parliament plays a role in Cabinet formation or dismissal. Both have a similar array of extra-parliamentary institutions, namely an Auditor, a number of anti-corruption agencies and Ombudsman. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that the key internal and external oversight tools and institutions are somewhat more effective—although still not particularly effective—in Trinidad & Tobago than in Grenada, with the exception of the anti-corruption agencies, which are considered somewhat more effective in Grenada. The evidence also indicates that facilitating factors are stronger in Trinidad & Tobago. Are these results peculiar to Trinidad & Tobago and Grenada, or are they generalizable to other small states, especially those in the Caribbean? Clearly, further research is needed.
CITATION STYLE
Staddon, A., & Stapenhurst, R. (2020). Parliamentary Oversight and Corruption in the Caribbean: Trinidad and Tobago and Grenada Compared. In Studies in Public Choice (Vol. 34, pp. 121–142). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-14140-0_7
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