Evolutionary anthropology, co-operation and warfare

Abstract

The chapter begins by reviewing recent work by Robert Kaplan and Steven Pinker, both of whom invoke Hobbes to support their argument that men are naturally violent or warlike. Kaplan and Pinker conclude that only 'strong government' can guarantee that society will not break down into anarchy. However, the failure of Western military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan to install strong government and enforce peace points to the need for a better understanding of the dynamics of conflict and co-operation. I therefore examine critically the anthropological evidence for violence among chimpanzees and in small-scale human societies that Pinker and others cite in support of their Hobbesian arguments and identify both inaccuracies in the data cited and problems in their interpretation. In the second part of the chapter, game theory and the concept of fitness landscapes are introduced to show how evolutionary anthropology can provide a more nuanced explanation for human competition and co-operation. These provide more accurate guidelines for practical application in forestalling civil disorder or restoring peace.