Corporate Collective Moral Agency

Abstract

The argument so far has focused on the short-comings of the view that corporate entities themselves can be regarded as moral agents. Although Werhane and Pettit develop theories that are metaphysically individualistic the moral agency of the corporation is nevertheless said to exists at a social level of description that functionally acts as an autonomously intending entity, while for French the moral agency of the corporation is metaphysically distinct from its members. As I have tried to maintain, corporate entities themselves do not exhibit the necessary characteristics for moral agency. However, a stronger argument can be made for corporate intentions and actions if we dispense with the notion that the corporation can possess the necessary characteristics for moral agency in a manner that is descriptively discontinuous with the characteristics of its members. Instead, it may be possible to develop a view of the intentions and actions of individuals together with the structure of their interrelations that may constitute a legitimate foundation for collective intention and action attributions. This constitutes a shift away from French’s teleological conception of a corporation’s intention (given as a directive by the corporate structure), to a conception whereby the collective intention originates from the corporate members themselves. I am also aiming to shift away from a conception of moral agency that rests on social level descriptions of the characteristics for moral agency that are in some way distinct from the constituent members.