Plenitude and mirrors of god in Leibniz

Abstract

It is customary to study Leibniz’s two most famous doctrines-the theory of monads and the thesis that the actual world is the best of all possible worlds-as if they belonged to wholly separate compartments of his thought. In some respects Leibniz himself seems to encourage such an approach to his philosophy. As we shall see, Leibniz tends not to address some obvious and pressing questions concerning the relations between the two doctrines. But though the tendency to compartmentalize these two doctrines receives some support from Leibniz’s writings, it is, I believe, mistaken. The two key doctrines are alike at least in that they both draw their inspiration from a theme of Plato’s Timaeus: the highest being can produce nothing but the fairest. Leibniz’s God cannot of course produce a world that is absolutely perfect, for then it would simply collapse back into God himself, but he will want to create the best of all possible worlds. Similarly, an absolutely perfect being will want to create a world of simple, immaterial beings that mirror his own perfections; in other words, he will create a world of substances that mirror his unity, activity, causal self-sufficiency and even, as far as possible, his omnipotence and omniscience.