Mandela’s Army: Urban Revolt in South Africa, 1960–1964

Abstract

This article focuses on Nelson Mandela’s tenure as the first commander-in-chief of Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK). It emphasises his objectives for MK as reflected in the archive of diaries, notebooks and reports that he produced at the time. It also looks at the effectiveness of his work as Commander by exploring how the army he built fared in its insurgency against the state. The article emphasises the seriousness of purpose of Mandela and colleagues, which is something they have not always been credited for in the literature. Also explored is MK’s history beyond Mandela’s arrest. This involves revisiting what would be the first ‘Free Mandela’ campaign in history. Led by the underground within South Africa, the campaign offers a platform from which to assess the durability and effectiveness of the structures that Mandela left behind. The history of the post-Mandela underground also encompasses ‘Operation Mayibuye’, which was the MK High Command’s first attempt at launching guerrilla warfare. Operation Mayibuye was not implemented. This was a result of a crackdown by the state, most notably with the raid on Lilieslief Farm in July 1963. The article looks at how the underground absorbed the blows that it received at the hands of the state from 1963 to 1964, including the process by which the leadership of MK shifted to the African National Congress’s (ANC’s) External Mission, led by Oliver Tambo. The contribution of the Communist bloc and independent African states in facilitating the transition is discussed, as well as the embedding of the armed struggle in the larger conflicts of the Cold War and decolonisation. Finally, the paper considers the legacy of the urban revolt of the early 1960s and its significance for the larger debate regarding the role of the armed struggle in the broader liberation struggle in South Africa.