An enhanced verifiable inter-domain routing protocol based on blockchain

Abstract

Promise-violating attack to inter-domain routing protocol is becoming common in recent years, which always causes serious consequences, such as malicious attraction traffic, broken network. To deal with this kind of attack, routing verification is introduced by current research. However, it can only detect attacks against a specific routing policy triggered by one malicious node, and no research has yet been conducted to solve the problem caused by multiple collusion nodes. In this work, we present BRVM, a blockchain-based routing verification model, to address the issue of violating shortest AS Path policy. The main idea of BRVM is to record the route proofs to verify whether a route violates the policy using the blockchain technology. The precondition of avoiding a collusion attack is that the proportion of the malicious verification nodes is lower than the fault tolerance rate of the consensus algorithm used in the blockchain. We theoretically prove the correctness of BRVM, and implement a prototype based on Quagga and Fabric. Our experiments show that BRVM can solve this kind of promise-violating problem caused by multiple collusion nodes, and about 21% faster than SPIDeR [14] in performance.