Freedom, Responsibility, and Luck II: Stipulative Arguments for the Proximal Determination Requirement and Three Arguments against It

  • Coffman E
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Coffman, E. J. (2015). Freedom, Responsibility, and Luck II: Stipulative Arguments for the Proximal Determination Requirement and Three Arguments against It. In Luck: Its Nature and Significance for Human Knowledge and Agency (pp. 129–163). Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137326102_6

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