We study multi-player turn-based games played on a directed graph, where the number of players and vertices can be infinite. An outcome is assigned to every play of the game. Each player has a preference relation on the set of outcomes which allows him to compare plays. We focus on the recently introduced notion of weak subgame perfect equilibrium (weak SPE), a variant of the classical notion of SPE, where players who deviate can only use strategies deviating from their initial strategy in a finite number of histories. We give general conditions on the structure of the game graph and the preference relations of the players that guarantee the existence of a weak SPE, which moreover is finite-memory.
CITATION STYLE
Bruyère, V., Le Roux, S., Pauly, A., & Raskin, J. F. (2017). On the existence of weak subgame perfect equilibria. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 10203 LNCS, pp. 145–161). Springer Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-54458-7_9
Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.