Choice of flexible production technologies under strategic delegation

  • Bárcena-Ruiz J
  • Olaizola N
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This paper analyzes a managerial delegation model in which firms can choose between a flexible production technology which allows them to produce two different products and a dedicated production technology which limits production to only one product. We analyze whether the incentives to adopt the flexible technology are smaller or greater in a managerial delegation model than under strict profit maximization. We obtain that the asymmetric equilibrium in which only one firm adopts the flexible technology can be sustained under strategic delegation but not under strict profit maximization when products are substitutes. We extend the analysis to consider welfare implications. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Author-supplied keywords

  • Duopoly
  • Flexible production technologies
  • Social welfare
  • Strategic delegation

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  • Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz

  • Norma Olaizola

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