Cost-based access regulation and collusion in a differentiated duopoly

  • Baranes E
  • Poudou J
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Abstract

This paper revisits the conventional doctrine that "it is easier to collude among equals", applied in the context of vertically related markets. In a differentiated duopoly model, we study how cost-based access price regulation may hinder the sustainability of tacit collusion. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Author-supplied keywords

  • Access
  • Collusion
  • Regulation
  • Vertical structure

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