Arguments concerning representations for mental imagery

Abstract

The argument for a propositional over a pictorial representation for visual imagery has largely taken the form of an attack on the logical coherence of pictorial representations. These attacks have not been valid since one can develop a coherent dual-code model involving pictorial and verbal (nonpropositional) representations. On the other hand, empirical demonstrations that are claimed to support pictorial representations fail to discriminate such representations from propositional ones. It is argued that the failure of the anti- and pro-pictorial arguments stems from a fundamental indeterminancy in deciding issues of representations. It is shown that wide classes of different representations, and in particular propositional vs dual-code models, can be made to yield identical behavior predictions. Criteria such as parsimony and efficiency in addition to prediction of behavior may yield further constraints on representation; and, in particular, it may be possible to establish whether there are 2 codes, one for visual information and one for verbal, or whether there is a single abstract code. It is concluded that barring decisive physiological data, it will not be possible to establish whether an internal representation is pictorial or propositional. (69 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved). © 1978 American Psychological Association.