Asymmetric Valuations and the Role of Collateral in Loan Agreements

  • Chan Y
  • Kanatas G
N/ACitations
Citations of this article
86Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.
Get full text

Abstract

Collateral can serve as a source of additional, indirect information in a rational expectations signalling context. The collateral chosen by the borrower provides a signal to the lender of the borrower's info., and in a rational expectations equiilibrium, the signal can be fully revealing. They conclude that it is the lower-quality, small and middle-size firms that provide collateral; in contrast, emphasising the use of collateral as a response to asymmetric valuations between transactors predicts that it is the better-quality firms in these size categories taht offer collateral.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Chan, Y.-S., & Kanatas, G. (1985). Asymmetric Valuations and the Role of Collateral in Loan Agreements. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 17(1), 84. https://doi.org/10.2307/1992508

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free