This paper investigates the nature of multicandidate electoral equilibria under three different classes of single-ballot-single-winner voting systems: (1) scoring rules (including the plurality rule, Borda's method of marks, and negative voting); (2) Condorcet completion procedures; and (3) multiple voting procedures (including approval voting). Some of the key findings of this paper are that (1) multicandidate equilibria under the plurality rule must be noncentrist; (2) in an election held under any Condorcet procedure, candidates have a dominant strategy to adopt the median voter's position; (3) there is a set of nontrivial voting methods for which equilibria routinely exist regardless of the dimensionality of the policy space; and (4) the plurality rule is alone among commonly discussed voting procedures in not having centrist multicandidate equilibria.
CITATION STYLE
Cox, G. W. (1987). Electoral Equilibrium under Alternative Voting Institutions. American Journal of Political Science, 31(1), 82. https://doi.org/10.2307/2111325
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