Master key forward security is an important property for identity-based key exchange protocols. Unfortunately, most of existing identity-based key exchange protocols do not satisfy this property. In this paper, we firstly analyse Xie's modified protocol to show that signature is undesirable for an identity-based key agreement protocol with the master key forward secrecy. Then we present two improved protocols from McCullagh-Barreto identity-based key agreement protocol to capture the master key forward security. Our first protocol is efficient and its security can be proved with the help of a decisional oracle, while the second one achieves stronger security and its security can be reduced to a computational problem in the random oracle model. The master key forward secrecy is proved under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. Copyright © 2010 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.
CITATION STYLE
Guo, H., Mu, Y., Zhang, X. Y., & Li, Z. J. (2010). Enhanced McCullagh-Barreto identity-based key exchange protocols with master key forward security. International Journal of Security and Networks, 5(2–3), 173–187. https://doi.org/10.1504/IJSN.2010.032216
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