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Journal article

Equilibrium Solution To the Lowest Unique Positive Integer Game

Baek S, Bernhardsson S ...see all

Fluctuation and Noise Letters, vol. 09, issue 01 (2010) pp. 61-68

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Abstract

We address the equilibrium concept of a reverse auction game so that no one can enhance the individual payoff by a unilateral change when all the others follow a certain strategy. In this approach the combinatorial possibilities to consider become very much involved even for a small number of players, which has hindered a precise analysis in previous works. We here present a systematic way to reach the solution for a general number of players, and show that this game is an example of conflict between the group and the individual interests.

Author-supplied keywords

  • game
  • lowest unique positive integer
  • nash equilibrium
  • projection operator

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Authors

  • Seung Ki Baek

  • Sebastian Bernhardsson

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