Gaming against managers in incentive systems: Experimental results with chinese students and chinese managers

  • Cooper D
  • Kagel J
  • Lo W
 et al. 
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Abstract

We examine strategic interactions between firms and planners in China, comparing behavior between: (i) students and managers with field experience with this situa- tion, (ii) standard versus increased monetary incentives, and (iii) sessions con- ducted "in context, " making explicit reference to interactions between planners and managers, and those without any such references. The dynamics of play are similar across treatments with play only gradually, and incompletely, converging on a pooling equilibrium. A fivefold increase in incentives significantly increases initial levels of strategic play. Games played in context generated greater levels of strategic play for managers, with minimal impact on students.

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Authors

  • David J. Cooper

  • John H. Kagel

  • Wei Lo

  • Qing Liang Gu

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