Identification of decision rules in experiments on simple games of proposal and response

  • Manski C
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Abstract

Experimental economics shares with econometrics the objective of inference on decision processes from data on observed behavior. However, experimentalists and econometricians have gone about their research in different ways, the former mainly using exploratory modes of analysis and the latter stressing formal inference on the distribution of decision rules that yield observed choices. An important concern of econometric research has been to determine the identifiability of agents' decision rules when choice data are combined with various forms of other information. This paper examines the identifiability of decision rules from experimental data on choices in simple games of proposal and response. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

Author-supplied keywords

  • Experimental economics
  • Identification
  • Social interactions

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Authors

  • Charles F. Manski

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